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Abstract 
Recent work has demonstrated the benefits of repeated 
judgments in improving the accuracy of estimates – both 
independent and repeated, individual judgments. The More-
Or-Less-Elicitation (MOLE) method has previously been 
shown to improve accuracy and precision of elicitation over 
single judgment elicitations (Welsh, Lee, & Begg, 2008). In 
this paper, we show the MOLE method delivers superior 
gains, in terms of both accuracy and calibration, over 
repeated-judgment elicitation, while taking significantly less 
time and not requiring filler tasks to distract participants from 
previous estimates. We argue that the structure of the MOLE 
method acts in the same manner as repeated judgment, 
resulting in multiple searches across the relevant space, 
without the associated problems of standard repeated 
judgments methods, such as additional time and participant 
recall and repetition of prior estimates. 
Keywords: Elicitation, Uncertainty, Overconfidence, 
Repeated judgments. 
Introduction 
Recent work has drawn attention to the benefits of repeated 
judgments in estimation/prediction tasks as different as 
election polling and box office takings projections (Wolfers 
& Zitzewitz, 2004). That is, having either multiple people 
all estimate the same value and then combining these (see, 
e.g., Surowiecki, 2004) or, less intuitively, having the same 
person make multiple estimates of the same value and 
combining these (Mozer, Pashler, & Homaei, in press; Vul 
& Pashler, 2008). 
The benefit of this approach is argued to lie in noise 
reduction. That is, to the extent that the error in one estimate 
is independent of the error in the others, the average of such 
estimates will tend to be better than any randomly chosen 
estimate. Even in the case of a single individual making 
estimates immediately one after the other, Vul and Pashler 
(2008) found that the average of two estimates was more 
accurate than either – supporting the conclusion that the 
error in each estimate is, at least partly, independent. 
Given this finding, it seems possible that incorporating 
repeated estimation into elicitation techniques, where expert 
opinions are converted into numerical judgments about the 
range and probability of possible outcomes (Wolfson, 2001) 
might yield improvements. Specifically, one would hope to 
see improvement in both the accuracy of estimates (how 
well they correspond to observations from the real world) 
and people’s calibration (how well confidence judgments 
accord with the proportion of accurate judgments, 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982) . 
There are, however, problems confronting anyone 
attempting to use repeated judgments as part of an 
elicitation technique. Primarily: we don’t have the time or 
resources to contact multiple experts to canvas opinions, 
which is why a single expert is often relied upon.   
On the other hand, asking a single individual to make 
repeated estimates of the same value may not yield 
independent estimates because of potential biases such as 
anchoring and the confirmation bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). That is, people are likely to be strongly influenced by 
the numbers they have just given or search for reasons that 
their first estimate is right rather than considering 
alternatives. Vul and Pashler’s (2008) results support this 
concern, showing that a repeated estimate made 
immediately after the first, while providing some benefit, is 
of far less benefit than one made after a three week period. 
Similarly, Soll and Klayman (2004) demonstrated that 
asking a person for two values – one that the true value will 
be above and one it will be below (with some likelihood in 
each case) produced better estimates than asking for a single 
range that the true value was expected to fall within. More 
recently, Herzog and Hertwig (in press) have shown that 
individual judgments can be improved via “dialectical 
bootstrapping” – a process inspired by research into 
consider-the-opposite debiasing methods (see, e.g., Larrick, 
2004) which result in individuals sampling from their 
knowledge in distinct ways. This method produced 
significant greater gains in accuracy on date estimation tasks 
than simply repeating the task but, again, did not equal the 
benefit gained from including a second person’s estimate.  
In all of these cases, however, the individual judgments 
have been limited to just two estimates. That is, the benefit 
seen is from averaging just two estimates.  
To avoid this problem, one needs a way of repeatedly 
asking an individual about the same estimation task, while 
avoiding the problems of repetition and confirmation 
described above. Thus, to be of the greatest benefit, it would 
seem that an individual’s repeated judgments need to be 
separated by either a significant period of time or distractor 
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tasks to maximize the independence of the judgments – 
although, of course, in terms of utility, any significant time 
delay will cause difficulties. An ideal task would also probe 
the elicitee’s knowledge repeatedly in different ways so as 
to get estimates that are as independent as possible. 
The MOLE and other methods 
The More-Or-Less-Elicitation (MOLE) method (Welsh, et 
al., 2008) seems well suited to offer a way of enabling 
multiple judgments to be gained from a single individual 
while avoiding the problems described above. The MOLE 
relies on repeated, relative judgments (selecting which of 
two options is thought to be closer to the true value); 
thereby avoiding the possibility of the elicitee simply 
repeating their answers. Also, by randomly selecting values 
from across the parameter space, it ensures that the elicitee 
is forced to consider new values rather than focusing on 
their initial value. The MOLE method has been shown to 
provide superior estimates to basic, single judgment 
elicitation techniques in terms of both accuracy and 
calibration (Welsh, et al., 2008).  
This study, therefore, aims to shows whether the benefit 
results obtained using the MOLE technique is equivalent to 
the use of other potential methods for obtaining repeated 
judgments from a single individual - either through direct 
repetition of the task or repetition with distractor tasks so as 
to attempt to avoid problems with participants being 




Forty-two participants were recruited; including graduate 
(12) and undergraduate students (18), university graduates 
(9) and a small number of non-university educated people 
(3). Seventeen participants were male and 25 female, with 
mean age of 28.7 (SD = 8.9). Each was given a $10 book 
voucher for their participation. 
Materials 
Three graphical user interfaces (GUIs) were designed along 
the same lines as those described in Welsh et al (2008), one 
for each of the three experimental conditions. That is, each, 
for any given trial, displayed a random array of between 100 
and 300 circles but the GUIs differed in terms of the 
responses available to participants.  
Figure 1 shows the MOLE GUI as it appears during a trial 
– displaying a random array of circles and asking the 
participant to select which of two numbers they believe is 
closer to the true number of circles. Once a selection had 
been made the slider activated and the participant was asked 
to indicate how confident they were that the number they 
chose was closer to the true value– from 50% (random or 
uninformed guess) to 100%. 
The other two GUIs, “Repeated” and “Interleaved”, were 
both variants on the Simple GUI from Welsh et al (2008). 
The primary difference between these and the MOLE GUI 
was that, rather than selecting from presented alternatives, 
participants using these interfaces were asked to enter their 
estimates into editable text boxes. Specifically participants 
were asked to give a minimum and a maximum estimate of 
the number of circles and then rate how confident they were 
that the true value would fall in that range using a slider. 
 




When participants were recruited for the experiment, it was 
described as an experiment on subjective probability 
elicitation methods, with no mention made of the 
experimental hypothesis – to maintain participant naivety.  
On arrival, participants read the information sheet and 
completed a consent form before being seated at a computer 
for the experiment. A within-subjects design was used, with 
participants completing all three tasks in a single session in 
an order determined by a Latin Square.  
Participants were allowed a short (2 minute) break 
between each of the three conditions while the experimenter 
checked that the data had saved and started the next part of 
the experiment.  Most participants completed the task in less 
than 40 minutes and none took more than an hour. 
Mole Procedure 
The MOLE GUI presented a single array of between 100 
and 300 circles to a participant, which remained visible for 
the entirety of the trial. It then randomly drew two 
alternatives from a range of 0 to 400. The participant was 
then prompted to select which of these they believed was 
closer to the true value and indicate how confident they 
were that this judgment was correct. 
If their confidence was 100% - that is, they were 100% 
convinced that their selection was closer to the true value 
than the alternative was – then the MOLE GUI used this to 
truncate the range from which future alternatives would be 
drawn. For example, if someone was 100% certain that the 
true number is closer to 100 than 300, then it was concluded 
that there was no point offering them values above the 
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midpoint of those options and the MOLE GUI adjusted the 
feasible range accordingly. 
Confidence ratings below 100% were not used to adjust 
the range but rather to assist in the construction of a PDF 
representing a participant’s beliefs about the likelihoods of 
different numbers as described in the Results section. 
Each participant saw a single array of circles in the 
MOLE condition and was asked to make 10 relative 
judgments (and confidence ratings) on this single array. 
Repeated Procedure 
The Repeated GUI also presented a single random array of 
100-300 circles that remained visible throughout the trial. 
Participants were asked to enter a minimum and maximum 
number representing the range that they thought the true 
number of circles would fall within. 
Participants were also asked to give a confidence rating 
for how likely it was that the true value would fall within 
this range (this was done as previous work has indicated that 
people tend not to use minimum and maximum in absolute 
terms, see, e.g., Welsh, et al., 2008). 
Each participant saw only one array of circles in this 
condition and was asked to give their minimum and 
maximum value 10 times – having been instructed that we 
were interested in seeing whether prolonged exposure to the 
stimulus led them to revise their estimates but that, if it did 
not, they were free to enter the same numbers on each trial. 
Interleaved Procedure 
The Interleaved GUI differed from the others in that it 
presented a series of arrays rather than just one. Specifically, 
forty arrays of between 100 and 300 circles were presented 
and the participant asked to give a minimum and maximum 
number of circles (with confidence rating) for each. 
Ten of the 40 arrays, however, were repetitions of a single 
array – such that participants in this condition completed 
essentially the same task as during the Repeated condition. 
These repeated arrays were distributed in a pseudo-random 
manner throughout 30 distractor trials in order to prevent 
participants seeing two identical arrays immediately 
adjacent or noticing any simple pattern (i.e., the 




During analysis of results, discrepancies were observed 
between a participant’s statements regarding their beliefs 
(made during testing) and the estimates recorded by the 
GUIs. Specifically, it was observed that the number of 
circles that participant said they believed most likely was 
not included within their final range. This was taken to 
indicate that they had either misunderstood the instructions 
or had accidentally entered the wrong value. To prevent this 
and other, unnoticed, errors from impacting results, all 
participants’ data were analyzed and removed if the error in 
their estimate on any of the three tasks was identified as an 
outlier – that is, lying more than 1.5 interquartile ranges 
above the third quartile (Hodge & Austin, 2004). In all, six 
participants were identified as having unusually inaccurate 
estimates in at least one condition and their data were 
excluded from the subsequent analyses. 
PDF Generation 
Participants’ responses in each of the three conditions were 
used to construct probability density functions representing 
their beliefs regarding the number of circles present in the 
viewed stimuli. The process used to generate the PDFs from 
the MOLE data was as described in Welsh et al (2008).  
That is, for each judgment, if the confidence rating was 
100%, the range of possible values was truncated – as 
described above - and a weight of 0.5 placed across the 
entire remaining range. For any confidence rating below 
100%, by comparison, the range was not adjusted. Instead, 
weights (determined by the confidence rating) were applied 
across the entire range. For example, if a person was offered 
the options 200 and 300 and selected 200 with 75% 
confidence, a weight of 0.75 was applied to all points within 
the current range closer to the selected option (200) and a 
0.25 weight to all other locations. 
This process repeated for each of 10 judgments made by 
an individual on a single array and a PDF built up in this 
way. After the 10th judgment was incorporated, the PDF was 
corrected by removing all weight lying outside the final 
range and then subtracting 99% of the lowest weight (these 
corrections dealt with excess weight added during early 
trials when much of the range is still considered feasible). 
Finally, the Beta-distribution that minimized summed 
squared differences from the resultant PDF was calculated 
and this used to represent the participant’s beliefs regarding 
the likelihood of various numbers. 
 
Figure 2. Example of PDF construction from individual, 
uniform PDFs.  



























In the Repeated and Interleaved conditions, by 
comparison, a somewhat simpler (although clearly related) 
method of PDF construction was used. Each participant 
estimated 10 ranges (Minimum to Maximum) for a given 
stimulus and each Min-Max range was used to define a 
uniform PDF to represent their beliefs regarding the number 
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of circles displayed for each instance.  The participant’s 
overall, or composite, PDF was then taken to be simply the 
average of the 10 uniform PDFs. 
For example, the uniform PDFs in the top subplot of 
Figure 2 are the actual ranges given by a participant in the 
first four stages of the Repeated condition and the 
composite PDF is simply the sum of the individual heights 
at each value divided by the number of PDFs being 
considered (4 in this figure but 10 in the experiment). 
Composite PDFs were then used to calculate the 
participant’s estimates of the mean and the range for 
determination of accuracy and calibration. For example, the 
composite PDF in Figure 1 yields a final range of 275-360 
and a mean estimate of 318.1.  
Comparison of Elicitation Methods 
To compare elicitation methods a number of measures are 
required - to assess the accuracy of estimates and the 
adequacy of estimated ranges. For accuracy, correlations 
between the true and estimated number of circles were 
calculated, along with absolute percentage error. 
Calibration, on the other hand, was examined by comparing 
the proportion of ranges that contained the true value (hits) 
and the confidence statements made by participants. 
 
Table 1. Summary of elicitation technique performance. 
 
 Accuracy Calibration 
Technique r |% Error| % Hits Confidence 
















Repeated 0.44 31.3 
(22.9) 
69.4 100 
Interleaved 0.49 23.5 
(20.1) 
88.9 100 
MOLE 0.66 22.4 
(15.8) 
91.2 100 
* - Single refers to data from individual trials of the repeated (R) 
and Interleaved (I) conditions. The values in these rows are thus 
means and SDs from the 10 trials. Means and SDs in the remaining 
rows are calculated from the 36 participants. 
 
Table 1 summarizes these key statistics used to look for 
differences between the elicitation techniques. The columns 
hold results for five elicitation methods – the three 
described above and summarized results from the individual 
trials of the repeated and interleaved conditions – 
representing single judgment elicitations. These results are 
discussed in greater detail in the following sections. 
Repeated versus Single Judgments 
The first comparison that needs to be made is between the 
repeated judgments elicitation techniques and their single 
judgment equivalents. Looking at Table 1, one sees the 
mean correlation between the true and estimated number of 
objects across the 10 trials of the Repeated method was 
0.42, while the composite estimate correlates slightly better 
at 0.44. Similarly, the correlation between the true value and 
composite value in the Interleaved condition, at 0.49, is 
somewhat stronger than the average of the correlations from 
the 10 Interleaved trials, at 0.39. In both cases, however, the 
composite estimates’ correlation is within a single standard 
deviation of the mean value of the individual correlations, z 
= 0.40 and 0.71 respectively, so concluding that the repeated 
judgments resulted in improvement is a long bow to draw. 
A similar pattern can be seen in the error scores, with no 
improvement from the use of the Repeated method over the 
individual trials comprising it and a small (and again 
statistically insignificant, z = 1.0) improvement from the use 
of repeated judgments in the Interleaved conditions. 
In the calibration data, however, we see a clear change 
resulting from the use of repeated judgments for both the 
Repeated and Interleaved conditions. For the former, the 
percentage of hits increases by 23.3%, z = 5.1, while for the 
latter it increase by 32.0%, z = 7.6. It is harder to say exactly 
what this means in terms of calibration, of course, as the 
confidence ratings given by participants apply only to 
individual judgments. But, assuming a 100% confidence 
rating for the composite judgments, there seems to be little 
difference in calibration using the Repeated method - 28.2% 
overconfidence in the individual judgments compared to 
30.6% in the composite, where overconfidence is defined as 
the difference between the percentage of hits and the 
confidence level. Comparing the composite and individual 
judgments from the Interleaved method, however, one sees 
a small decrease in overconfidence from 16.2% to 11.1%.  
Overall, there seems to be weak evidence that the use of 
repeated measures is of benefit to the accuracy and 
calibration of elicited ranges but only where the repeated 
judgments are interspersed amongst distractor tasks.  
Accuracy 
Turning now to the primary comparison between the three 
elicitation methods, Figure 3 shows scatterplots between 
estimates made in each condition and the true value. 
Looking at Figure 3, one can see that estimates made 
under all three conditions show evidence of some degree of 
accuracy – with a positive relationship observed between 
the estimates and the true value. The strength of the 
relationship, however, varies from 0.44 in the Repeated 
condition to 0.66 in the MOLE. All of these correlations are 
significant at the .01 level and the MOLE results are 
significant at p <.001 indicating that estimates elicited using 
the MOLE are the best predictors of the true value. 
A correlational study, however, while indicating the 
strength and direction of a relationship misses a key factor 
in determining accuracy – the fit between the ideal and the 
observed data, represented in Figure 3 by the dotted line.  
Looking at the results in column 2 of Table 1, one sees 
the percentage error scores achieved by participants in each 
elicitation method. Once again, the MOLE technique is the 
most accurate, with a mean error of 22.4%. The Interleaved 
method does almost as well, with a mean error of 23.5%, 
while the Repeated is, again, the worst with a mean error of 
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31.3%. A repeated-measures one-way ANOVA conducted 
comparing these results, found a near significant result, 
F(2,70) = 2.41, p = .097. Paired sample t-tests confirmed 
that, considered separately, both the MOLE and Interleaved 
methods produced better results than the Repeated, t(35) = 
1.81 and 1.70, p = .040 and .049, respectively. 
 
Figure 3. Scatterplots of true and estimated number of 
circles in arrays. N = 36 in all cases. 




















Interleaved: r = 0.49










The second measure of the adequacy of an elicitation 
technique is the level of calibration achieved by people 
using it. That is, how often the ranges elicited from them 
contain the true value compared to how often the 
participant’s confidence level indicates they should. 
In all three conditions participants made confidence 
judgments after every individual judgment (selection 
between options or estimation of range). These confidence 
ratings, however, do not directly relate to the overall 
confidence that the true value will fall within the final range 
calculated from a participant’s PDF. Instead, as was done 
with the MOLE results in Welsh et al (2008), the final range 
is treated as a 100% confidence interval when calculating 
overconfidence for each technique. The calibration data for 
the three techniques is shown in Table 2. 
Looking at the data in Table 2, one sees that the MOLE 
condition produced the best calibrated results, with 91.2% 
of the composite ranges containing the true value (c.f. 
90.6% in Welsh et al (2008)). By comparison, the 
Interleaved condition ranges contained the true value 88.9% 
of the time and the Repeated condition 69.4%.  
Clearly, the percentage of hits observed depends on two 
things – the accuracy and of the range. The accuracy of 
judgments was discussed above so here a repeated-measures 
one-way ANOVA was run to determine whether the 
difference in range width was significant across conditions. 
This indicated a significant effect, F( 2, 70) = 18.7, p <.001. 
Paired sample t-tests revealed that this significant result was 
caused by differences between the Repeated condition and 
the other two, t(35) = 6.63 and 4.19, p < .001 for the 
Interleaved and MOLE respectively, with difference 
between range widths in the Interleaved and the MOLE 
conditions approaching significance, t(35) = 1.45, p = .077. 
 
Table 2. Calibration data for elicitation techniques including 
mean and SD range widths. 
 
Technique % Hits Conf. Overcon. Range Width 
Repeated 69.4 100% 30.6 167.5 (138.8) 
Interleaved 88.9 100% 11.1 332.6 (157.1) 
MOLE 91.2 100% 8.8 289.4 (127.5) 
Note: ‘Conf’ refers to the assumed confidence rating of 100% for 
composite ranges. ‘Overcon.’ is the difference between the 
confidence and the number of hits. 
Time 
A third important consideration for any elicitation technique 
is its ease of use. For the purposes of this study, we regard 
the time taken to complete a single elicitation to be one 
measure of this. Table 2 shows the time taken to complete 
an elicitation task under each of the three conditions. 
Looking at the data in Table 3, it seems clear that the 
MOLE is easily the fastest of the techniques, taking an 
average of just 3 minutes to complete. The Repeated method 
also fares relatively well, taking between 4 and 5 minutes to 
complete while the Interleaved method required an average 
of more than 17 minutes to complete. Of course, this is not 
surprising given that the Interleaved condition required four 
times as many judgments to be made as the Repeated – 
thereby ending up four times as long. 
 
Table 2. Time to complete task by condition 
 
Condition Mean Time (secs) SD 
Repeated 252 87 
Interleaved 1033 377 
MOLE 180 90 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA confirmed the significance 
of the differences in time taken, F(2, 70) = 194.8, p < .001, 
and paired sample t-tests indicated that all three conditions 
differed significantly from one another, t(35) = 13.5, 6.1 and 
14.6, for the R vs I, R vs M and I vs M comparisons 
respectively, p <.001 in each case. 
Discussion 
The results presented above offer some support for the use 
of repeated judgments in elicitation tasks – in line with 
expectations. The Repeated method, subject to all of the 
standard problems with repeated individual judgments, 
unsurprisingly, failed to improve either the accuracy or 
calibration of elicited ranges. By contrast, there is evidence 
that the Interleaved method, which aimed to avoid these 
problems by locating the experimental trials within a series 
of distractor tasks, yields a benefit. Specifically, there was a 
small increase in the accuracy of estimates but also a 
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significant increase in the width of elicited ranges and a 
commensurate decrease in overconfidence. Finally, the 
MOLE method was clearly superior to either of the other 
methods – being more accurate, generating less 
overconfident ranges and taking the least time to complete.  
The question as to why this might be is an interesting one. 
Clearly, the MOLE technique forces people to consider 
options that they otherwise may not have resulting in 
multiple searches of their beliefs about the stimulus. That 
the Interleaved condition does not provide equal benefit, 
however, indicates that there may be more to it than this.  
One possibility is that the use of relative, rather than 
absolute, judgments in the MOLE allows people to use more 
finely tuned cognitive abilities – taking advantage of the 
fact that people tend to better at making relative rather than 
absolute judgments (see, e.g., Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). 
Limitations  
Despite the strength of the results, there are limitations that 
should be addressed. First, there is a question of whether 
people in the Interleaved condition realized that one 
stimulus was repeating. One participant did state they 
believed this to be the case but the much wider ranges in the 
Interleaved condition compared to the Repeated argues 
against this having been a common feeling. 
Secondly, the MOLE technique has an advantage over the 
others in that it starts with a pre-specified range from which 
to draw its numbers and thus limits participant’s estimates 
to this 0-400 range, whereas people in the other conditions 
were free to make any estimate they chose. While this is 
true, it should be noted that none of the estimates from the 
Repeated and Interleaved conditions actually fell outside the 
0-400 range once outliers had been removed. 
Finally, it should be noted that the overconfidence scores 
used herein are based on assumptions regarding the 
confidence that a participant would place in the final 
composite range from any of the conditions rather than 
direct measurement thereof. 
Future Directions 
Given the promising results, further development of the 
MOLE to address some of the concerns raised above and 
improved its ability to capture people’s beliefs need to be 
considered. For example, starting with a wider pre-
generated range to avoid the above criticism or utilizing a 
person’s partially constructed PDF during testing to better 
guide the values that are presented. 
Another improvement would be to add in, following the 
MOLE technique as it stands, an evaluation stage where 
participants are shown the range/PDF they have generated 
and are asked to indicate how likely it is that the true value 
will fall within this region. 
Conclusions 
In all, the results support the use of repeated individual 
judgments in elicitation tasks but only under circumstances 
where the standard problems with this process can be 
overcome – either through the use of time delays between 
judgments or other means such as distractor tasks.  
Where these are not possible, however, the MOLE seems 
to yield the benefits of repeated measures without these 
problems – its technique of asking for repeated, relative 
judgments avoiding the problems of simple repetition 
without the need for lengthy delays or complex 
experimental design. 
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